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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Alpha Security Trust, a named petitioner which is the entity which holds
certain of the subject property, in trust, for the benefit of third parties.
Eugene B. Lynch, one of two trustee of Alpha Security Trust. Mr. Lynch
is representing himself in these proceedings.
Harold Perkins, a named petitioner and owner of certain of the subject
property. Mr. Perkins is representing himself in these proceedings.
Board of Equalization of Rich County, State of Utah, the entity which
originally denied petitioners' request for reduction of the assessed value
of the subject property, resulting in petitioners' filing a Petition for
Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission.
The Utah State Tax Commission, the agency which entered the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision which is the subject of
the Petition for Review.
In addition to Mr. Lynch and Mr. Perkins, Mr. Marvin Zulauf appeared
at the formal hearing in this matter on July 7,1995. The exact role of Mr.
Zulauf is unclear; however, he asserts a beneficial interest in the property
of Alpha Security Trust as a beneficiary and appeared representing
himself, Alpha Security Trust, and in a consulting or advisory capacity to
Mr. Perkins.
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JURISDICTION
This case was originallyfiledby petitioners in the Utah Supreme Court and was
later assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2-2(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Board of Equalization of Rich County, State of Utah (hereinafter
"respondent") objects to the issues presented for review and the standard of review as
set forth by petitioners in their opening brief insofar as those issues were not raised by
petitioners below. Specifically, respondent objects to petitioners' allegations regarding
deprivation of due process.
Petitioners assert for the first time in their opening brief that the Commission
inappropriately granted respondent ten days after the hearing within which to verify
sales information, thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to cross-examine
respondent regarding the post-hearing information presented. In fact, the information
that was submitted by respondent was in rebuttal of information provided by petitioners
for thefirsttime at the hearing. That information consisted of the hearsay opinions of
local realtors and local real estate agents obtained and submitted by petitioners to

1

demonstrate decreasing property values prior to the subject tax lien date and increase
in property values after the hen date. The individualsfromwhom petitioners obtained
this information were not presented as witnesses by petitioners and were not subject
to respondent's cross-examination. The Commission's determination that principles
of fundamental fairness mandated that respondent be allowed to confirm or rebut that
testimony was entirely appropriate1 and petitioners made no objection regarding posthearing submissions.
Petitioners also alleged at the hearing for thefirsttime that certain of the sales
used by respondent's experts in the appraisals submitted into evidence involved
transactions which were not "arms length transactions" and/or which included
substantial personal property. Those allegations were not raised prior to the hearing
by petitioners.2 As a result, respondent was not able to prepare to refute petitioners
allegations at the time of the hearing. Again, petitioners made no objection to the
Commission's ruling that the parties be allowed ten days after the hearing to refute the
1

In addition to being supported by equitable considerations, the Commission's decision
to accept post-hearing submissions is supported by the Tax Commission Rules {see Note 12, infra).
Further, it is common for the Commission to solicit and accept supplemental information from the
parties after a hearing. See, e.g., Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 350 (Utah
1996); Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n (ex rel. Union Pacific Railroad Co.), 1996 WL
364749 (June 18, 1996), at 5. A true and correct copy of this case is attached as Appendix 1.
2

See Notes 7, 8, and 10, infra.
2

new information presented by petitioners.
Petitioners also assert they were deprived of due process by reason of the
Commission refusal to allow petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine respondent's
witnesses and to present their case. Respondent directs the court's attention to the
transcript of the proceedings, which clearly demonstrates the contrary is true. The first
part of the hearing was devoted to Mr. Zulauf s presentation of petitioners' positions.
Mr. Zulauf, who acted as the spokesman for petitioners at the formal hearing, freely
questioned Mr. Jolley3 and the respondent's expert witnesses.4 Other than an
occasional comment by the Commission to indicate that the time set for hearing was
passing and an admonishment to one party or another to move on to another topic,
neither petitioners nor Mr. Zulauf, their designated representative, was denied the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who appeared in behalf of the respondent.
Finally, petitioners assert that the bulk of the hearing was devoted to the
Commission's and respondent's challenge to the credentials of Mr. Zulauf to prepare
and submit an appraisal for use in determining the fair market value of the subject

3

Transcript of proceedings ("Tr.) at pages 50-70.

4

Id. and Tr. 70-75. In addition, both Mr. Perkins and Mr. Lynch interjected comments
throughout the hearing, which was conducted in a somewhat informal manner to allow the widest
possible latitude insofar as participation by all parties was concerned.
3

properties. A significant portion of petitioners' post-hearing submissions dealt with
that issue.

In fact, Mr. Jolley made a motion to exclude the comparison exhibits

prepared by Mr. Zulauf and the petitioners (hearing exhibits 2 and 3) based upon the
fact that neither petitioners nor Mr. Zulauf is hcensed under Utah law to perform
appraisals. That motion was denied.5 There is no evidence in the record to indicate
that any material, be it testimony or tangible exhibit, submitted by petitioners was
rejected as a result of the fact that petitioners and Mr. Zulauf are not hcensed to
appraise property within the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent objects to the statement of the case presented for review set forth
by the petitioners to the extent that it misrepresents the facts of the case and/or misleads
the court concerning the procedural posture of the case at the time of the formal hearing
and events leading to the formal hearing. Respondent believes that some of the
confusion may have resulted from the fact that the petitioners did not have the benefit
of a transcript of the formal hearing at thetimepetitioners' opening brief was prepared
5

Tr. 78-80. Of dispositive significance is that the Commission denied the motion to
exclude the evidence presented by petitioners. In fact, Mr. Zulauf indicated that the exhibits were not
appraisals, but merely assisted in preparing exhibits to critique the appraisals performed by the
respondent's appraisers. Tr. 129-131.
4

and may, therefore, have inadvertently misstated the sequence of events. To correct
such misstatements of fact, respondent provides the following statement of facts.
1.

On or about October 18,1994, the Rich County Board of Equalization issued a

final decision, reducing the assessed value of parcel 41-33-28-077 (the "Lynch
property"), owned by Alpha Security Trust, Eugene B. Lynch, Trustee ("Lynch") from
$108,290.80 to $97,000.00. See Exhibit 1 to Lynch Notice of Appeal, R. 3046.
2.

On or about November 21,1994, Lynchfileda Notice of Appeal with the Utah

State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), No. 94-2231, challenging thefinaldecision
of the Rich County Board of Equalization. R. 304.
3.

On or about October 18,1994, the Rich County Board of Equalization issued a

final decision reducing the assessed value of parcel 37-19-01-085 (the "Perkins
property"), owned by petitioner Harold Perkins ("Perkins") from $96,945.85 to
$95,348.00. R. 323.
4.

On or about October 31, 1994, Perkins filed a Notice of Appeal with the

Commission, No. 94-1680, challenging thefinaldecision of the Rich County Board of
Equalization. R. 320.

6

The specific page of the Board's final decision is not bate-stamped in the official

record.
5

5.

The Lynch and Perkins appeals were later consolidated at the request of

petitioner Perkins. R. 295.
6.

A settlement conference was held on May 2,1995, in Randolph, Utah, which

was converted to a Prehearing Conference at the suggestion of Chairman W. Val
Oveson. Both petitioners and respondent agreed to conversion of the settlement
conference to a prehearing conference. R. 4. A formal hearing was set for July 7,
1995. R. 5.
7.

On May 22,1995, the Commission entered its Notice and Order, formally setting

July 7,1995, as the date of the formal hearing, and setting the following pre-hearing
schedule:
a.

Each party shall prepare exhibits, documents or appraisals and
exchange the same with the other party by June 3,1995.

b.

Each party shall conduct all discovery and have answered
questions arisingfromany discovery by June 30,1995.

c.

Any exhibits, documents or appraisals that have not been shared as
per the above mentioned schedule and either party has not had the
opportunity to do discovery on them, will not be allowed as
evidence in the hearing.

R. 267-68.
8.

On or about May 30,1995, Lynch and Perkins submitted Interrogatories to the

6

respondent. R. 230 and 255.
9.

On or about June 2,1995, respondent provided Lynch and Perkins with copies

of the appraisals upon which respondent intended to rely at the formal hearing and
submitted its own requests for discovery. R. 194 and 196.
10.

On or about June 23,1995, petitioners submitted their responses to respondent's

discovery requests.7 R. 167-175. Petitioners'responses are virtually identical. Both
responses indicate the appraisals which petitioners intend to submit are verbal and both
responses fail to identify alleged errors and omissions in the respondent's appraisals,
which had been provided to petitioners with respondent's June 2, 1995 discovery
requests.8
11.

On or about June 29, 1995, respondent submitted its responses to the

interrogatories of petitioner Lynch, together with documents supporting the position

7

Although both responses are dated June 23, 1995, the response of Mr. Lynch was
received by the Appeals Unit of the Tax Commission on July 7, 1995, and the response of Mr.
Perkins was received by the Appeals Unit of the Tax Commission on June 29, 1995. R. 167 and 172.
8

Respondent's discovery requests to Perkins state: "During the settlement conference,
mention was made by the appellant of possible errors in the BischofFPia appraisal. Please list each
portion of the appraisal you believe to be in error and provide documentation supporting your claim.
We must allow the appraisers an opportunity to reconcile or refute any such claim." R. 195, 197.
Similar language was included in the discovery requests to Lynch. Petitioners' response to this
discovery request was: "We have not yet completed our review of the BischoffTPia appraisal." R.
167, 172.

7

respondent intended to take at the formal hearing. R. 98-135.
12.

On or about June 29, 1995, respondent submitted its responses to the

interrogatories of petitioner Perkins, together with additional documents supporting the
position respondent intended to take at the formal hearing. R. 136-166.
13.

A formal hearing was held on July 7,1995. R. 324 (Transcript of Hearing)9. At

the hearing, respondent made a motion to exclude any documents or information
challenging the Pia/Bischoff appraisal based upon petitioners' failure to reply to
respondent's discovery requests and based, further, upon the fact that petitioners had
been in possession of the appraisal for ten months prior to the formal hearing. R. 32829, Tr. 5-6. Respondent's motion was granted. R. 330, Tr. 7.
14.

Later in the hearing, petitioners introduced evidence concerning the lack of arms-

length transactions and the inclusion of personal property in sales used as comparables
in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal. R. 429-432, Tr. 106-109. In response to petitioners'
representations that they had not received the information until after the expiration of
the June 30,1995 deadline10, the Commission allowed the evidence to be introduced,

9

The transcript of formal hearing was electronically recorded and not transcribed until
June 20, 1996, after petitioners' opening brief was filed.
10

The petitioners represented, through Mr. Zulauf, represented that they did not provide
the respondent with their criticisms of the Pia/Bischoff appraisal for two reasons. First, petitioners
8

but granted respondent additional time after the hearing to submit materials to refute
the untimely evidence. R. 435-436, Tr. 112-113. The Commission specifically stated
that both petitioners and respondent could submit additional materials in rebuttal of
evidence presented at the hearing, although no new evidence could be presented. n R.
436, 462; Tr. 113,139.
15.

Petitioners raised no objection at the hearing to the Commission's ruling

regarding post-hearing submissions.12

had not received responses to their interrogatories and wanted to wait to see if the responses
addressed their criticisms before identifying the specific areas of contention for respondent. R. 430;
Tr. 107:12-19. The petitioners also represented that the additional information they intended to
present had not come into their possession until the Sunday before the Friday hearing, which was July
2, 1995. Petitioners gave no indication of why the information was not provided to the respondent
between Monday and Friday.
11

Respondent has included extensive detail concerning the backdrop against which the
Commission allowed post-hearing submissions in view of the arguments contained in petitioners'
opening brief which urge the court to determine that such post-hearing submissions violated
petitioners' constitutionalrightsto due process. See Petitioners' Brief, pp. 10, 20-24, 35, etc. It is
apparent from a review of the transcript that the additional time allowed by the Commission was
necessitated by petitioners' failure to respond to discovery requests rather than by the Commission's
desire to thwart petitioners. Recognizing that petitioners were not represented by counsel and may
have been unfamiliar with the formalities of the appeals process, the Commission clearly acted to
accommodate petitioners, not respondent, by allowing post-hearing submissions.
12

Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-6A gives the Commission wide latitude relative to
the consideration of evidence and specifically provide for the submission of post-hearing materials:
. . . [A]ny disclosure of facts shall not prohibit the Commission from
relying upon facts subsequently discovered at any stage of the
adjudicatory proceeding. However, the party against which such
newly adopted legal theories or newly discovered facts are asserted
9

16.

After receiving post-hearing submissionsfromboth petitioners and respondent,

the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision
in these consolidated cases on October 13,1995. R. 4.
17.

Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Writ of Review on October 25,1995. R.

2.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR REDUCTION
OF THEIR PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS
BASED ON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE ASSESSMENT
ROLL, GENERALLY, WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Petitioners assert that the entire assessment roll of Rich County is "fatally
defective." In support of this broad and far-reaching allegation, petitioners submitted
at trial an exhibit which purported to represent a random sampling of actual sales of
properties located within Rich County, contrasted with the values of those properties

shall have opportunity to argue against such legal theories or refute or
explain such facts before any order of the Commission is issued.
[Emphasis supplied.]
10

as reflected on the assessment roll of the Rich County Assessor.13 Petitioners argued
that this exhibit irrefutably established that the values of properties listed on the Rich
County assessment roll were in error by an average of 55%.14
Based solely upon this exhibit, petitioners urged the Commission, and now urge
this court, to determine that the entire assessment roll was fatally defective, thus
entitling petitioners to the requested reduction in assessed value15. That result is simply
insupportable.
Petitioners' exhibit identifies eight parcels of property, comparing their assessed
value with their actual sales price. Petitioners presented no evidence on the total
number of parcels located within Rich County which the sampling purports to
represent. The sampling contains no information concerning the terms of the sales,
whether the sales are arms-length transactions, whether the sales include personal

13

Hearing Exhibit No. 1, R. 47.

14

Mr. Zulauf, speakingforboth petitioners, acknowledged that item 6 on the exhibit was
off by only 5%. Explaining the divergence from the average on that particular sale, Mr. Zulauf
explained that he thought the assessor "got lucky on that one." R. 337, Tr. 14:19.
15

Petitioners quote the USPAP standards for developing a mass appraisal, but have
failed to present any evidence that the Rich County Assessor did not comply with those standards.
Further, one of the appraisers who was present and did testify specifically stated that the appraisal
submitted in evidence. Tr. 144:15-19; R. 367.

11

property and, if so, the value of the personal property included16, or numerous other
data that would make the exhibit relevant to a determination of whether properties in
Rich County, generally, are assessed at their full market value. In fact, Mr. Zulauf
acknowledged at the hearing that the exhibit does not establish that petitioners'
assessments are higher relative to the assessments of other Rich County property
owners.
[Commissioner] Were you trying to prove then that you are
tax dis ~ or your assessments are higher relative to the
others?
[Mr. Perkins] Some of them. That's true. Most of them.
[Mr. Zulauf] Yes. They are.
[Mr. Perkins] Most of the others.
[Commissioner] Or were you trying to —
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, but that table doesn't prove that. I
believe that that's the case, what you stated. I believe the
16

The exclusion of this type of information is particularly puzzling in view of petitioners'
insistence that virtually every sale of recreational or second-home property in Rich County includes
personal property valued at between $10,000 and $40,000.
Perhaps it is not so surprising in view
of the comments of Mr. Perkins at the hearing (Tr. 41, R. 364):
[Mr. Zulauf] . . . Again, this is one [1623 East Cisco Road] of the
sales where — This one sold all the furniture away, 1623.
[Mr. Perkins] that's one that had some furniture, maybe not all.

12

case — I believe our assessments are ~
R. 440-441; Tr. 117-118.
The discussion between the Commissioner and Mr. Zulauf continued and the
Commissioner ultimately provided some insight concerning the basis for the
Commission's rejection of the argument and the reason why the Commission found the
exhibit unpersuasive.
[Commissioner] No. I didn't say it. I'm trying to ask you
ifyousaidit.
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, if I didn't say it, I'm saying it now. I
believe that their assessments are higher relative to their
other assessments on the tax roll in proportion. In other
words, let's take Christensen for example. His was ninetyeight percent in error. In other words, his property was
$187,000.00 — sold for $187,500.00, and it was assessed
at $90,000.00. Clearly, he was getting a tax break
compared to Mr. Lynch whose property is — is worth
somewhere $65,000.00 to $75,000.00, and he's being taxes
at $97,000.00.
[Commissioner] But the determining factor there is that if
the — if the property is worth $60,000.00.
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, even if it's — Let's say it's worth
$100,000.00. If his is at the very top of market value and
they've got his appraised within three percent of the value,
he's paying the correct share he should be paying. But what
about Christensen over here, he's only paying half of what
he's supposed to be paying. Some — The money has got to
13

go somewhere, somebody has got to be making up for that
low assessment, and I know who two of them are, it's
Harold and Gene.
[Commissioner] Let's move onfromthis. Again, Mr. Jolley
indicated to you that the Property Tax Division does do a
sales ratio study on this very issue each year, who have
those statistics over time that do not reflect what you have
just mentioned. Mr. Jolley are you proceeding?
R. 441-442; Tr. 118-119. [Emphasis added.]17
If petitioners' Exhibit No. 1 is reflective of any trend, it is an indication that the
Rich County Assessor undervalues properties on the assessment roll, rather than
overvaluing them. Had the exhibit been given probative weight for the only proposition
it supports, the Commission would have been justified in raising the value of
petitioners' properties.
In Utah Power & Light v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979),
17

See, also, comments of Craig Jolley and Mr. Zulauf at R. 436, Tr. 113:
[Mr. Jolley] Also, I wanted to comment — well, ask — we
appreciate your input as far as the mass appraisal program. Weren't
you aware though that the Tax Commission has the jurisdiction to
assess the County's ability or their accuracy in performing appraisal
work and that they do these ratio studies and they do them in a very
scientific manner, much more so than you've attempted to do here,
but that they have jurisdiction to do that?
[Mr. Zulauf] I'm — I'm aware of that. I'm also aware that it's
inaccurate, so whatever method they're using.

14

the Utah Supreme Court determined that in a case where the taxpayer claims an error
in its assessment, the taxpayer has the obligation to show substantial error in the
assessment and to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Tax Commission
may adopt a lower valuation (id. at 335) and noted:
. . . The universally recognized rule of the actions of
administrative agencies requires this Court to take some
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in its particular
field and accordingly to give some deference to its
determination, and not to upset the decision unless it appears
that the action of the Commission is so in error or so unfair
or unreasonable, that it must be regarded as arbitrary, a
circumstance which we have not found present here.
Id. [Footnote omitted.] See, also, Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-7G.
Here, the Commission allowed petitioners to place Exhibit No. 1 into evidence,
even though it was untimely. The Commission heard the arguments of petitioners and,
based upon the lack of probative value of the evidence presented in support of that
argument, the Commission found the argument to be without merit.

15

POINT II.
PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES
IN THE RESPONDENT'S APPRAISAL EVIDENCE
ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Respondent first addresses petitioners' position regarding the alleged failure of
respondent's experts to prepare their appraisals in conformity with applicable federal
statutes. Petitioners ask this court to direct the Commission and the respondent to
reduce the assessed value of their properties for tax year 1994 because, inter alia, the
Commission and the respondent did not know of, conform the evidence presented to
the Board of Equalization or the Commission to, or otherwise follow the requirements
of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), as those
standards are set forth in 12 C.F.R. 34, et seq.18, created in connection with the
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA"). The record, however, supports a contrary conclusion. The
transcript of the formal hearing indicates that at least one of the respondent's appraisers
specifically testified that he was aware of the standards and that his appraisal report
was prepared in conformity with those standards.
Further, the appraisals submitted by the respondent at the formal hearing and
18

Petitioners' Brief, at, e.g., p. 12.
16

upon which the Commission chose to rely pass muster under USPAP, as more fully
discussed below.

A.

Respondent's experts were aware of and prepared their appraisals
in conformity with USPAP.

Respondents again submit that petitioners' position in their opening brief may
have been significantly different had they referred to the transcript of these
proceedings. During direct testimony at the hearing, Mr. Leroy Pia19 made the
following statement:
We were not commissioned to assess the conditions of a
mass appraisal, we were commissioned to make an appraisal
of property at 1932 Bear Lake Boulevard that is commonly
known as the Lynch property. We conducted an inspection
of the property internally and exterior on July 14, '94 and
completed that appraisal, complying with guidelines that
we believe are acceptable guidelines, USAP was noted
earlier, and we believe that this appraisal complies with
that.
[Emphasis added.]
The record of the hearing clearly contradicts petitioners' position and their

19

Because the hearing was electronically recorded and the transcript was not prepared
until nearly a year after the hearing, it is difficult to determine exactly who is speaking at times.
Designated in the transcript as "Speaker", this testimony is attributed to Mr. Pia as a result of
respondent's interpretation of comments before and after the testimony. In any event, however, it
is clear that the testimony is attributable to one of respondent's appraisal expert witnesses.
17

assertions that the County's experts had never heard of USPAP.20
B.

The comparable sales utilized bv respondent's experts were verified
at the time the appraisals were prepared.

A recurring theme throughout petitioners' brief is that the Commission erred in
allowing respondent's experts to verify sales information a year after the appraisals
were conducted. Petitioners have misinterpreted or misrepresented both the appraisals
submitted at the hearing and the post-hearing submissions of the respondent. In fact,
the comparable properties included in the appraisals submitted by respondent's
appraisers were verified.
The Pia/Bischoff appraisal was submitted into evidence and marked at the
hearing as Exhibit 10 (R. 55-86). The comparables are shown at R. 57-58. The
disclosure concerning the source of the data obtained by the appraisers to verify the
information regarding the comparable properties is summarized below:
Comparable No. 1, 931 East Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah;
Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey
Comparable No. 2, Lot 7, Lakota Subdivision, Garden City,
Utah; Verified through Rich County records and Bill Petersen,
Agent
Comparable No. 3,1162 S. Bear Lake Blvd., Garden City, Utah;
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Petitioners' Brief, p. 18:8-9.
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Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey
Comparable No. 4, 1623 E. Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah;
Verified through Rich County Records and Buyer - Survey
Comparable No. 5, 85 East 200 North, Garden City, Utah;
Verified through Rich County records and Bill Petersen, Agent
Comparable No. 6,759 East Gus Rich Lane, Garden City, Utah;
Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey
The same is true for the appraisal submitted by Mr. Farrell with respect to the
Perkins property, although the sources of the data differ slightly:
Comparable No. 1, 931 E. Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah;
Verified through County Sales File - and Buyer - Survey
Note: Same as Comparable No. 1 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal
Comparable No. 2,1623 E. Cisco Road, Lakewood [sic], Utah;
Verified through County Sales File and Buyer - Survey
Note: Same as Comparable No. 4 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal
Comparable No. 3, Lot 69 Sidesway [sic] Subdivision,
Lakewood [sic], Utah; Verified through County Sales File and
Buyer - Survey
Comparable No. 4,1162 S. Bear Lake Blvd., Garden City, Utah;
Verified through County Sales files
Note: Same as Comparable No. 3 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal
The information that was verified by respondent's experts after the formal
hearing related only to petitioners' assignments of errors. For example, petitioners
alleged that the Pia/Bischoff appraisal was faulty because comparable no. 1,931 East
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Cisco Road, did not account for personal property that was included in the sale. That
information was apparently not contained in the verification source used by
respondent's appraisers. As a result, the appraisers took steps to verify the information
which petitioners provided at the hearing during the ten-day post-hearing period
allowed by the Commission.
POINT III.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT
AND THE FINAL DECISION ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Because petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence in this case, it may not
be apparent to the court that each point raised by petitioners at each stage of this tax
appeal was convincingly refuted. The final section of this responsive brief is, therefore,
devoted to an extensive discussion of the evidence presented by petitioners and the
manner in which that evidence was refuted.
As noted by the Commission in its final decision, the fundamental dispute
between the parties is the quahty of adjustments to comparable sales in the appraisals
submitted by respondent's experts. At the formal hearing, petitioners raised a number
of objections to the appraisals submitted. Each of those objections is addressed below.
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A

The Pia/Bischoff Appraisal of the Lynch Property.
1.

Inclusion ot personal property in two of the six comparable
sales utilized in the appraisal

As noted above, petitioners assert that respondent failed to include any
adjustments for personal property included in comparable sales. In fact, the Pia/
Bischoff appraisal shows a $10,000 adjustment for personal property included in the
sale of comparable no. 5. R. 58. Nevertheless, respondent has never taken the position
that either the County or its experts are infallible. In fact, the discovery requests
submitted by respondent specifically requested informationfrompetitioners concerning
alleged errors in the appraisals so that adjustments could be made prior to the hearing.
Petitioners alleged at the hearing that personal property valued at $10,000 was included
in the sale of comparable no. 1, requiring a downward adjustment in that amount. In
response to this information, respondents conducted an additional inquiry, which
produced the following information:
. .. We spoke with Mr. McLean on Monday, July 10, 1995...
He further reports a refrigerator and stove were included in the
sale, as were other attachedfixtures,but that he brought in beds,
a sofa and most other furnishings. He admitted a few odds and
ends such as a mghtstand, and some pictures, were left behind
by the seller. We included no personal property value in our
appraisal, and thus wish to adjust for this more accurate
information. At most a used refrigerator and various other items
could be worth $ 1,000. This would lower the value indicated by
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this comparablefrom$106,860 to $105,860 or $104,860. This
supports the concluded subject value better than our earlier
number.
R. 19 (Exhibit A8 to petitioners' opening brief).
Petitioners assert (Petitioners' Brie£ p. 19) that they reverified the $10,000 deduction
they claim is appropriate for personal property included in the sale (Exhibit 2, R. 49).
Petitioners assert that this reverification supports a deduction of "at least 5% of the sales
price as personal property" (referring to Exhibit A9, page 3 to petitioners' opening brief)
[petitioners' post-hearing submission, R. 14]. The reference to this comparable sale found
at Exhibit A9, page 3; R. 14] states as follows:
In Sales Comparable No. 1, 931 East Cisco Road, Rosalind
Sjostrom owned the property and gave it to her son, Richard
Sjorstrom and his sister. Richard Sjostrom borrowed money
from his uncle, the father of David J. McLean, Richard
Sjostrom's cousin. The father, Mr. McLean agreed that Richard
Sjostrom's debt would be off set for his part of the property; and
purchased Richard's sister's part. Therefore, Richard sold the
house to David J. McLean. The lot at the time of sale was 69*
wide with a house and 69' wide unimproved, [interlineation
illegible] the unimproved portion was kept by the father. The
"appraisal" (referred to by Mr. Pia) was done by the bank
present, a relative of David's wife. The appraisal came in at
$84,000 but we don't know if the appraisal is for the house with
69' front footage or 138 feet front footage (69 x 2 = 138).
Additionally, the appraisal was done by a loan officer and not
a licensed appraiser. This is what the appraiser, Mr. Pia calls an
arms length transaction. If the court wishes to verify this
information, Richard Sjostrom's phone number is (801) 5825528.
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R. 14.
The court will note that there is absolutely no reference in this somewhat lengthy and
rambling account which relates in any way to personal property included in the sale or the
value thereof. Yet petitioners earnestly argue that this "reverification" information must be
seen by the Commission and this court as superior and more credible than the information
provided by respondent's expert, which does, in fact, deal specifically with the issue of
personal property.
Petitioners assert that "Sale 3 of the BishoflTLynch [sic] appraisal was not verified by
Respondents" and that "Petitioner verified the sale to included [sic] 10% of the sale price as
personal property (A9 page 4)." Petitioners' Brief, p. 19. In fact, the issue of whether
personal property was included in that sale was not raised by petitioners during the hearing.
In fact, the information included in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal of the Lynch property was
verified through the Rich County Records and Buyer Survey. R. 57. In fact, petitioners'
reference in support of their reverification contains no reference at all to this comparable
sale. The entire text of the referenced page is reproduced here:
cost no out of pocket expense, but the question is, what would
it cost him to have the personal property hauled off and
disposed of? An adjustment that should be included in the sales
price.
It appears that reading Mr. Pia's letter, is an attempt to
justify overlooking adjusting for market conditions at time of
sale and personal property that should of been made by
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appraisers.
If any appraisal indicates bias, it is that of Mr. Pia's,
paragraph 3 of page 3 of the Pia letter, indicates that appraising
property at Bear Lake is difficult for appraisers unfamiliar with
that market place. We agree! Harold Perkins and Gene Lynch
have tracked all the properties around the lake for the last 15 to
20 years. We know all the sellers and purchasers and in most
cases, the Realtors involved in the transactions.
As pointed out in court, Mr. Pia and Mr. Bishop have
appraised only one property at Bear Lake in the last 12 months.
We do not think appraising one property at Bear Lake qualifies
them as experts on lakefrontproperties. Especially, when they
don't verify their sales with the buyer, seller or broker and when
they are unwilling to survey Brokers of what's happening in the
area.
Dated August 10, 1995

Respectfully Submitted,
Gene Lynch and Harold Perkins

R. 15.
Petitioners assert that:
Sale 4 of the Bishoff/Lynch [sic] appraisal was verified to
included [sic] personal property that had no value by the
Respondent's appraiser. However, this verification took place
over 1 year after the appraisal was completed and 19 months
after the sale had taken place. The Petitioner's [sic] verified this
transaction at the time of sale to included [sic] 10 to 15%
personal property. (A9 page 5)."
Petitioners' Brief, p. 19-20.
In fact, the issue of whether personal property was included in the sale of comparable
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no. 4 was not raised by petitioners during the hearing. In fact, the information included in
the Pia/Bischoff appraisal of the Lynch property was verified through the Rich County
Records and Buyer Survey. R. 58. In fact, petitioners' reference in support of their
reverification is non-existent.

There is no page 5 either in the record or the copies of

petitioners' brief exhibit provided to respondent.
Petitioners assert that:
Sale 5 of the Pia/Bishoff [sic] letter was conspicuously
absent of the inclusion of personal property within the sales
price. Again the appraisers appear to be trying to save face and
their clients [sic] relationship. As verified by the Petitioners
(A9 page 5) Sale 5 included 2 boats, 2 wave runners, furniture,
appliances etc. valued at 11% of the sales price or ($156,000 x
. 11) $17,050. The Petitioners verified this sale while in escrow
and verified it with two principles [sic] of the transaction.
Petitioners' Brief, p. 20.
In fact, the Pia/Bischoff appraisal received in evidence at the hearing contains a
deduction of $10,000 for personal property included in the sale related to comparable no. 5.
R. 58. In fact, the comparison exhibit presented by petitioners at the hearing to refute the
Pia/Bischoff appraisal shows no deduction for personal property in connection with this sale.
R. 50.21
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Petitioners' Brief acknowledges that the property sold for $155,000. Petitioners' Brief
at p. 20:5-6. However, the comparison exhibit presented by petitioners at the hearing indicates the
sales price was $105,000. Accepting all adjustments to value made by petitioners and adjusting this
comparable sale only to reflect the correct sales price (plus $50,000), the value presented by
petitioners at the hearing ($62,175 plus $50,000 = $102,175) (Exhibit 2, R. 50) is nearly identical to
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With respect to comparable no. 6, petitioners' assert:
Sale 6 was verified by the Respondents appraiser(s) on July
11, 1995, one year after their appraisal was completed and
approximately 3 years after the sales took place. Even the
Respondent's reported $5,000 of personal property inclusive in
the sales price, supports [sic] the Petitioners [sic] verification.
The Petitioners verified this sale shortly after it took place with
Merl Spence, the listing/selling agent. Merl verified the value
of the personal property to be 10% of the sales price or $10,000
(A9 page 5).
Petitioners' brief, p. 20.
In fact, the comparison exhibit submitted by petitioners at the hearing reflects the
sales price of this comparable as $75,000. R. 50. Based on petitioners' sales figure and not
the higher salesfigureof $105,000 contained in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal (R. 58), the 10%
attributable to personal property would be $7,500, not $10,000. Again, the reference in
support of petitioners' evidence is nonexistent It is, therefore, impossible to ascertain what
petitioners' evidence is. Did Mr. Spence verify a sales price of $75,000, which included
personal property valued at $7,500? Did Mr. Spence verify the actual sales price of
$105,000? The respondent's appraisers did, in fact, seek to confirm the allegations made by
petitioners during their post-hearing investigation:
Sale Comparable No. 6,759 East Gus Rich Lane was purchased
by Mark and Joan JensenfromDale and Inez Marler in an armslength transaction. Mr. Milt Jensen, Mark's brother, confirmed
this on Tuesday, July 11, 1995 from Veyo, Utah (801) 574that presented by respondent's expert ($102,950, R. 58).
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2749. He also mentioned the purchase price included all
furnishings down to knives, forks and spoons in the cabin at the
time. He reported estimated value of such furnishings at $5,000.
Making this adjustment would change this comparable's value
indication from $86,475 to $81,475. This widens the value
rangefrom$83,600 at the lowest (Sale No. 2) to $81,475. This
widens the value range, the previously concluded value remains
supported within the range.
R. 20.
The evidence in the record which supports petitioners' position is in stark contrast to
the concrete information provided by respondent's appraisers. In fact, other than the
ambiguous and unsupported references identified above, the only evidence presented by
petitioners relating to the value of personal property sold with comparable properties used
was the testimony of Mr. Zulauf at the formal hearing:
[By Mr. Bischoff or Pia] You saw the picture and you've
seen the properties regarding the — and I'm referencing
the furniture packages, and I'm astonished that you could
find that there was probably ten thousand or twenty
thousand worth of personal property items unless there
was a tractor or a boat or something in there. We've
done a lot of work in southern Wasatch counties,
including properties throughout Park City, and, in fact,
I was personally involved with a model project that cost
$20,000.00 to furnish out and it was done by an interior
designer. Explain how you came up with the $10,000.00
and $20,000.00 personal property adjustments.
[By Mr. Zulauf] We sat down andfiguredout what we
thought it would cost to furnish a house — the house,
and then in a lot of these cases we couldn't — we didn't
27

get an itemized list of what they were, so when we talked
to the people, we asked them well, you know, did it go
with furnishings, and they would say yes, we included
furnishings, and we didn't ask them for a specific list, we
said well approximately how much do you think that is
and they — most of the time they'd say don't know, so
we'd say well do you uiink it's around $10,000.00 and
they'd say yes.
Tr. 124-125, R. 447-448.
B.

The Farrell Appraisal of the Perkins Property.

Respondent notes that neither Mr. Farrell nor respondent submitted post-hearing
materials in support of the appraisal of the Perkins property. This can be attributed to
the fact that only four comparable properties were included in the Farrell appraisal and,
of those four, three were also identified and discussed in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal.22
As a result, respondent's summary of evidence in support of the Pia/Bischoff appraisal
as it relates to comparable properties also applies to the comparable properties used in
the Farrell appraisal of the Perkins properties. See, also, Point H.B. above for
information relating to verification of data contained in the Farrell appraisal.

22

In the Farrell appraisal, comparable no. 1 is the same as comparable no. 1 in the Pia/
Bischoff appraisal; comparable no. 2 is the same as comparable no. 4 in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal;
and comparable no. 4 is the same as comparable no. 3 in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal.
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C.

Petitioners' deductions relating to appreciation ot properties after
January 1,1994.

The other significant area of disagreement between petitioners and respondent
involves the trend of market values. Petitioners asserted that market values were
consistently declining until some time after the January 1,1994, lien date. Beginning
January 1, 1994, property values began to increase at the rate of approximately 15%
per year. As a result, petitioners argued, the value of the comparable properties utilized
by respondent's appraisers must be adjusted downward. This "time adjustment" was
needed to accurately reflect the appreciation of the appreciation which the comparable
properties enjoyed from the hen date through the date of sale. Petitioners argued that
the values of the comparable properties23 must be reduced to reflect an appropriate time
adjustment as follows:
Comparable No. 1
Comparable No. 2
Comparable No. 3
Comparable No. 4
Comparable No. 5
Comparable No. 6

Minus $2,000
Minus $6,000
Minus $23,000
Minus $3,200
Minus $22,300
Minus $3,800

23

Again, because three of four comparable properties used in the Farrell appraisal are
also included in the Pia/Bischofif appraisal and, further, because the discussion at the formal hearing
and post-hearing submissions centered mostly on the Pia/Bischoflf appraisal, only the Pia/Bischoff
appraisal is discussed in this subpart.
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R. 48-50, Hearing Exhibit 2.
To support appropriateness of the time deduction, petitioners presented Exhibit
4, entitled "Survey of Value Appreciation since 1-1-94." R. 52. This survey relies on
the oral representations of four local real estate professionals, which representations
were summarized in the exhibit. Explaining the exhibit and petitioners' conclusions
regarding value trends, Mr. Zulauf testified:
Okay. Now, that sale was based on a survey that we
conducted with Otto Mattson who is a local real estate
broker, and we asked him basically if they thought that that
[sic] the properties had appreciated since January 1st of
1994, and if so, on an annual basis how much it was, and
Otto Mattson, who is a local real estate broker, his estimate
was fifteen percent a year.
We asked the same question to Merrill — Merl
Spence, and their estimate was ten percent per year and
higher for lake front properties. Paul Webb, another local
real estate broker, we asked him what he thought that
property values had increased at since January 1st of 1994,
and his estimate was twenty percent per year, and it was
based on apparent sales analysis of houses that he had had
listed for two years for $50,000.00 and they hadn't sold, and
now they're selling for approximately $75,000.00.
And then the fourth realtor that we surveyed was Bill
Petersen, and his estimate was is that properties have
appreciated about ten percent per year since January 1st,
1994, and that's the basis for the time adjustments that we
made on all of our — all of our sales.
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Tr. 28-29; R. 351-352.
Petitioners assert that respondent's appraisals failed to make the appropriate time
adjustment and that petitioners' evidence regarding the appropriateness of the time
adjustment, generally, and the percentage adjustment, specifically, were completely
uncontested by respondent. Petitioners' Brief, pp. 21,27. Petitioners also assert that
respondent's failed utterly to speak with local professionals, finding them to be
"optimistic and unreliable."
Petitioners' inability to refer to the transcript in the preparation of their brief is
again apparent. At the hearing, there was specific testimonyfromrespondent's experts
concerning their conversations with local real estate professionals.
We spoke with Mr. Peterson, and he's a — he's a — he's
a delightful guy. He's a real estate agent as well as an
Appraiser, which makes it difficult to know when he's
speaking for what. We didn't ask him about his opinion
about value increases, we asked him about sales data,
because we didn't want to use his opinion. What we wrote
was that there was a peak in the early eighties, somewhere
very near when Mr. Lynch sold this stuff for a thousand
bucks a front foot. After that it declined throughout the
eighties.
It appeared to us, based on past appraisals over the last few
years up there, that somewhere around '89 or '91 was
probably the bottom, and that it kind of sat, as far as value
trends go, up until somewhere in what we say is from '92
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until now property values have been increasing moderately,
but have no regained values of the early eighties.
Tr. 56; R. 379.
Regarding the reliability of broker/realtor opinions, respondent's experts
testified:
[Zulauf] Oh, right, but would you agree that in the absence
of a (inaudible) sales analysis and just not doing anything in
a situation that — that maybe surveying hopefully
knowledgeable people in the area would be better than just
doing nothing?
[Speaker] No. I would not agree. Realtors are notably
optimistic, their opinions have to be taken with a lot of salt.
[Zulauf] So you don't rely on brokers' opinions?
[Speaker] Not ideally.
Tr. 73, R. 396.24
In addition to the testimony presented by respondent at the hearing, further
support for the Commission's decision to reject the time adjustments made by
petitioners is found in the post-hearing submissions of the parties. From respondent's
submissions, it is clear that each of the local real estate professionals upon whom
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This specific exchange also refutes petitioners' claim that they were denied the right
to cross-examine respondent's witnesses.
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petitioners relied. The following evidence is contained in the record:
On Tuesday, July 11,1995, Mr. Bill Peterson, broker (801)
946-3226, reported he thinks there has been a steady
increase from 1991 through 1995 of roughly 30%. He has
not seen any dramatic turn-a-round, but did have plenty of
listings available in 1994, and not much available now. He
thinks things have tightened considerably in 1995. He
thinks the increase has been pretty steady, with some
acceleration in summer 1994 and into this year, 1995.
R. 21 (Post-hearing submissionfromPia/Bischofi).
Mr. Otto Mattson, broker (801) 946-3305 agreed the market
peaked in 1982, then plummeted badly through the 1980s,
when we spoke with him on Tuesday, July 11, 1995. He
says roughly a 17% decrease in values over 1991 and 1992
occurred. He reports 1993 and 1994 were very slow for
marketing time, but values just sat, moving neither up or
down. He says he has seen a 23% increase in value in the
last nine months and reports the market has really tightened
with nothing available on the lake front to speak of. He
points to a listingfromApril 1994 at $145,000 which was
taken off the market, then put back on in June, 1995, and
sold in one week at $165,000.
R. 20 (Post-Hearing submission from Pia/Bischoff).
We spoke with Merl Spence, broker (801) 946-8600 on
Monday, July 10,1995. She said it is very hard to say there
has been any clear value trend the last few years. She
reports a turn-around in 1994 in cabins oh the hills, but no
real movement of beach front properties. She thinks
values were relatively stable along the beach from 1991
through 1994. She thinks it is turning up now in 1995,
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but was improving only for cabins without lake front
property in 1994. She admits it is hard to precisely know,
given the lack of sales along the beach. She says the 1995
market is tight and anything that comes up for sale moves
rapidly.
R. 20 (Post-Hearing submissionfromPia/Bischoff). Emphasis added.
Based upon their verification of the evidence presented by petitioners at the
hearing, respondent's experts reached the following conclusions:
This anecdotal evidence appears to us to remain insufficient
to support significant adjustments to sales rangingfromMay
1992 to July 1994, for a valuation date of January 1,1994.
The first two brokers' [Mattson and Spence] comments
seem to support no adjustments for a rather slow but neither
falling nor increasing market in that time, while the third,
Mr. Peterson, supports some steady increase over that time.
The point of agreement among the brokers is from the
summer of 1994 onward when all three point to a tight and
increasing market. This period, however, is not applicable
to the subject valuation.
* * *

. . . Adjustment for market conditions changing over time
during the period in question is, in our judgement [sic], still
insufficiently supported, and no such adjustments are
applied. The previous value conclusion remains sound.
R. 21 (post-hearing submission of Pia/Bischoff).
The post-hearing submissions of respondent directly contradict petitioners'
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interpretation of Ms. Spence's opinion. Mr. Zulauf s testimony and Exhibit 4 indicate
that Ms. Spence opined values for lake front properties have increased since the hen
date an average of 10% per year. The information provided by Ms. Spence to
respondent's experts indicates no appreciation for lakefrontproperties, but only for
cabins without lakefrontproperty.
In what appears to be an effort to reconcile the conflicting information provided
by the same real estate professionals, petitioners advance the following, somewhat
incredible argument:
. . . The Petitioners verifications were based on face to face
interviews (moretiianone) with Merl Spence, Otto Mattson,
Bill Peterson, and Paul Webb. The interviews were
conducted by the Petitioners that have owned properties on
the lake for over 15 years. The petitioners know each of the
Realtors by sight, are on afirstname bases [sic], and freely
exchange information with each other. These brokers/
realators [sic] are some of the principals the petitioners
verified the personal property included in each of the
Respondent's sales. The petitioners verify sales and market
conditions with these Realtors every year. The Petitioner's
asked the right questions. They surveyed lake front
properties not property values (all types ..cabins, non lake
front etc.) in general.... It is unreasonable to assume the
Respondents appraisers with one day of experience and a
one to three minutes single phone call can gather better and
more reliable information than the Petitioners can in two 15
to 30 minute person to person interviews and follow up
phone calls. It is also unreasonable to assume realtors/
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brokers would divulge more accurate details of sales, to an
unidentified appraiser on the phone, than they would to
someone they have known for years....
Petitioners' Brief, pp. 22-23.
Petitioners' argument appears to be that the Commission is only entitled to
consider the petitioners' interpretation of the local realtors/brokers because those
individuals would only give accurate information to the petitioners and would be less
accurate and forthcoming to anyone other than petitioners. Instead of advancing an
argument that is supportive of petitioners' view, however, petitioners' position clearly
demonstrates that the Commission correctly accepted the conclusions of respondent's
experts and disregarded the anecdotal evidence of the local realtors/brokers.
D.

Respondent's calculations concerning value per frontage foot are
supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioners make lengthy arguments concerning "land value adjustments" which
relate to the method by which respondent's experts calculated the value of the real
property. In fact, these "land value adjustments" are calculations of the value of the
real property, per front foot, based upon actual sales of properties which occurred in
Rich County. R. 62. At the hearing, petitionersfreelyquestioned respondent's experts
concerning the sales used. Petitioners challenged respondent's use of those sales,
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asserting that only the sales selected by petitioners should be considered. The
following exchanges between the parties perhaps best illustrate the irreconcilable nature
of the dispute:
[Mr. Jolley]... Comparable number one, under location it
indicates superior with one next to it, we do down to the
bottom and final — under — he's listed under final
reconciliation one, lists year round access, closer to water,
more privacy.
[Mr. Zulauf] And more privacy. Right.
[Mr. Jolley] Okay.
addressing here.

Those are the three issues I'm

[Mr. Zulauf]. Okay.
[Mr. Jolley] Inspecting these properties, it's apparent that
these properties are right on the road, the useable buildable
area is so small that any structure would have to be built
right against the road. I don't see, and maybe you can
explain to me, how is it more private.
[Mr. Zulauf]: Oh, okay. I can explain that to you. Mr.
Lynch's property is on the — right next to Sweetwater, and
when the water recedes, their private beach is no longer
private, it becomes public, and people drive their boats up
there, they camp on the property, they run up and down the
beach with four wheel drive vehicles, and so that to me
means that — that — that Mr. Lynch's property has less
privacy and this comparable has more privacy, because ~
[Mr. Jolley] Were you aware that Ronavue Beach was down
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around the other side near these properties and that the
same rights exist when the water goes down on that side
of the lake as on Mr. Lynch's side of the lake?
[Mr. Zulauf] Yeah. I just don't think they have as many
people, and there's — what is it, aboutfivemiles?
R. 417-18; Tr. 94-95. Emphasis added.
The exchange continued on another topic:
[Mr. Jolley] Let me ask you about comparables number
four, five and six, where you've also made a location
adjustment because you claim these comps are superior and
you ask $20,000.00, $20,000.00 and $14,000.00. The
numbers that you have there, number one, if you look down
below, it says year round access, closer to marina, closer to
Garden City. The letter that I sent to you guys, would you
please turn to attachment twelve in that letter?
[Mr. Zulauf] We have attachment twelve. [R. 135]
* * *

[Mr. Jolley] The location of four, five and six are closer —
you've indicated closer to the marina, closer to Garden City
and made a sizeable adjustment. Do you also see the comps
one and two and three on the opposite side of the lake?
[Mr. Zulauf] Yes.
[Mr. Jolley] Why did you not make an adjustment for being
closer to the marina or closer to Garden City in that instance
where it would have been actually a positive adjustment,
and why didn't you do that to be consistent with the others?
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[Mr. Zulauf] Yeah. Well, there's several reasons. As I
viewed the lake and the properties that I looked at, it seems
to me like we got two market segments here. There's
people that are on the side of the lake where we have comps
one, two and three, and they also have a boat ramp where
they have access in case they're involved in water sports
right down by comps one and two. Yeah. And also up by
three. But I kind of view that as people who want to be oh,
more secluded, away from the city, and city conveniences
like water services and things like that.
[Mr. Jolley] If it's a different market, why did you include
them in the same analysis and not make adjustments for
something like that?
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, because I — from viewing the — the
sales that we had, it seemed to me like there were two
different market places, and it just didn't seem to me like
it would be appropriate to do that. I guess I can't ask you
questions, but go ahead.
[Mr. Jolley] It certainly would make it more consistent if
you applied the same adjustments for all comps rather than
pick and choose the ones that lower the value is my
impression.
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, I don't think so, and that's not what we
did. That's — It appears to me that there's two distinct
markets, there's people who want to be close to Garden City
and the marina, and there's people who don't want to be
close to that.
R. 418-21; Tr. 95-98. Emphasis added.
This exchange illustrates the deference to which petitioners believe their opinions
39

are entitled based solely on the fact that they are property owners in the area. No
empirical data is offered to support the "two market" theory which is offered to support
negative adjustments to some comparable properties, but an absence of adjustment in
cases where adjustment would add to value. This inconsistency, and all other areas of
disagreement between petitioners and respondent, are to be resolved in petitioners'
favor because petitioners' opinions support the conclusion petitioners wish to be
reached. More is required.
Although respondent may sympathize with petitioners and their inability to
persuade the Commission to accept the lightness of their position, respondent must
nevertheless point out that the evidentiary support which petitioners urge this court to
embrace in order to reverse the final decision of the Commission is comprised of
nothing more than conclusory statements, speculation, and wishful thinking on the part
of petitioners. This case is replete with examples to support this conclusion, both
those extracted and set forth above and others which are not specifically set forth in this
brief but are nonetheless prevalent throughout the record.
As noted above, more is required to overcome the deference this court is
required to afford the Commission's factual findings, which amply support the final
decision in this case. As this court noted in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n,
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877 P.2d 169 (Utah App. 1994):
.. . We believe that Utah Power & Light [Co. v. State Tax
Com % 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979)] thus stands for the
proposition that to prevail in this real property tax dispute,
Hercules had to accomplish two things during the formal
hearing before the Commission. First, Hercules had to
demonstrate that the County's original assessment contained
error. Second, Hercules had to provide the Commission
with a sound evidentiary basis for reducing the original
valuation to the amount Hercules proposed through its
appraisal experts.
Id, at 172.
The submissions of petitioners simply do not provide the sound evidentiary basis
necessary for this court to set aside the factual findings of the Commission, which
findings are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record.

POINT IV.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VALUES PLACED
ON THE PROPERTIES BY PETITIONERS
AND BY RESPONDENT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO
APPRAISER JUDGMENT AND MERE
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION
Dispositive of this appeal is that body of law developed in the State of Utah
which recognizes that mere differences of opinion as between experts will not suffice
to set aside the factualfindingsof an agency subject to judicial review. This principle
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is set forth in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, supra, where the major
difference between the values placed on the subject properties were attributable to
differing expert opinions relative to functional and economic obsolescence. In its
opinion affirming the decision of the Commission, this court stated:
While the concepts of functional and economic
obsolescence are easily grasped in a theoretical sense, the
task of quantifying the amount of obsolescence appears to
be an unpredictable undertaking. [Footnote omitted.] The
testimony of both Mr. Shoup and Mr. Kent demonstrated
that they were, in the end, simply making educated guesses
as to the appropriate amounts. In this kind of a case, one
longs for clarity and easy computation; however, it simply
does not exist. The appraisers' inability to arrive at
comparable numbers highlights the difficulty of the task
rather than their inadequacy. Accordingly, the Commission
was left with two disparate appraisals that contained
educated "estimates" of the proper amount of functional and
economic obsolescence. We defer to the Commission's
determination that the County's appraisal was more credible
than Hercules's. Since the County's appraisal was
supported by substantial evidence, it was reasonable for the
Commission to accept it. We therefore hold that the
Commission did not fail to properly account for functional
and economic obsolescence.
877 P.2d, at 174-75. See, also, Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 916 P.2d 344
(Utah 1996) (proper apphcation of appraisal techniques depends upon varying factual
circumstances that defy generalization; valuation of property for tax purposes is art, not
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science; it is a function of judgment, not of natural law).
CONCLUSION
The differences between petitioners' asserted values and respondent's assessed
value are attributable to differences in appraiser judgment and differences in application
of appropriate appraisal theories. The petitioners failed to marshal the evidence on
appeal and failed to carry their burden of proof, both on appeal and before the
Commission. Thefindingsof the Commission are supported by substantial evidence
and may not, under Utah law, be set aside.
Respondent respectfully submits that the court must affirm the final decision of
the Commission in this case.
Respectfully submitted this J__

day of October, 1996.

Attorneys for Rich County, Respondent
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Robert A. Peterson, James D. Douglass, Steven E.
McCowin, Salt Lake City, for Union Pacific
RUSSON, Justice:
**1 Petitioner counties (the Counties) appeal from a
ruling of the Tax Commission (the Commission)
adopting a revised property tax assessment of Union
Pacific Railroad Company's railroad property in Utah
for the 1990 tax year. The revised assessment was
agreed upon by Union Pacific Railroad Company
(Union Pacific) and the Property Tax Division of the
Tax Commission (the Division), the division
responsible for assessing property for the Commission.
We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
On April 30, 1990, the Commission sent Union
Pacific a notice of assessment, notifying Union Pacific
that it had $301,320,000 of taxable railroad property in
Utah. On June 1, 1990, pursuant to section 59-2-1007
of the Utah Code, Union Pacific filed a petition for
redetermination with the Commission, claiming that the
assessment exceeded its fair market value.

Pagel

While the 1990 petition was pending, the
Commission resolved Union Pacific's appeal of the
Division's 1989 assessment of Union Pacific's railroad
properties. In 1993, using the earlier decision as a
guide, the Division and Union Pacific agreed to aher
the appraisal methodology of the 1990 assessment
The negotiations between the Division and Union
Pacific centered on the appraisal methods used by the
Division in fulfilling its statutory and constitutional
responsibility to assess the fair market value, as of the
hen date, January 1, of railroad property. See Utah
Const art. Xm, § 1 1 ; Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-104.
The Division generally employs three recognized
approaches or indicators of value—cost, income, and
market-if the indicators are applicable to the property
under consideration and if reliable information exists to
apply the indicators. The cost approach determines
property value on the basis of its cost less depreciation.
The income approach determines the value of property
by, first, determining the reasonable income expected
to be earned by the property and, second, capitalizing
that income by the return expected to be realized on
comparable properties in the market to compute the
present value of the anticipated income. The market
approach uses the prices at which comparable
properties are bought and sold as a basis for
determining the value of the property under
appraisement.
Because railroads such as Union
Pacific are rarely bought or sold, the Division uses a
surrogate market approach known as the stock and
debt approach. Under this indicator, the market value
of a railroad's property is determined by considering
the market value of the railroad's common and
preferred stock in addition to the market value of its
bonds (or debt).
Following application of these
indicators, the results are reconciled to a single
estimate by the Division that is based upon its opinion
of the relative applicability, accuracy, and probity of
each indicator. Because the indicators are used to
appraise the value of all of a railroad's holdings,
including property outside Utah, an allocation factor is
used to determine the value of the property in Utah.
The application of these indicators, in light of the
Commission's resolution of Union Pacific's appeal of
the 1989 assessment, constituted the subject matter of
the negotiations between Union Pacific and the
Division.
**2 The Division and Union Pacific agreed that in
light of the Commission's resolution of the 1989 case,
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the stock and debt indicator should be altered. One of
the modifications to the stock and debt indicator
concerned the method of ascertaining Union Pacific's
stock price. In the 1989 case, the Division and Union
Pacific presented divergent estimates of Union Pacific's
value under the stock and debt indicator due to the
different methods used by each in establishing Union
Pacific's stock price. Union Pacific used an average
annual price, while the Division used a year-end stock
price. Confronted with the choice of deciding which
method was more appropriate, the Commission chose
Union Pacific's average annual approach to valuing
stock. On the basis of the Commission's choice, the
Division agreed to alter its 1990 valuation of Union
Pacific's stock using an average annual stock price.
This reduced the stock and debt indicator of value by
approximately $110 million. (FN1)
Union Pacific and the Division also agreed to modify
the income indicator of value partly on the basis of the
1989 decision.
Under the income indicator, the
taxpayer's estimated income is discounted by a
capitalization' rate to convert anticipated income into
present value. The appraiser can use either direct or
yield capitalization. In this case, the Division decided
to use direct capitalization. Under this approach, the
rate is based upon the earnings-to-price ratios of
comparable companies and debt rates. (FN2) The
earnings-to-price ratios are determined by dividing the
comparable companies* respective earnings by their
respective stock prices. (FN3)
Various changes to the income approach used in the
original assessment resulted in a decrease in Union
Pacific's value under the income indicator by
approximately $1.2 billion. The first change was the
use of the comparable companies' average annual stock
prices to derive the capitalization rate. In the 1989
case, the Commission adopted the use of average
annual stock prices of comparable companies to
compute the capitalization rate.
During its
negotiations with Union Pacific, the Division agreed to
do the same, resulting in an increased capitalization
rate. Dividing Union Pacific's income estimate by the
higher capitalization rate decreased Union Pacific's
value under the income indicator. (FN4)
The third modification to the income indicator was
not precipitated by the Commission's resolution of the
1989 case. In formulating earnings-to-price ratios in
the derivation of capitalization rates, various methods
are available to determine earnings. In the original
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assessment, the Division used a "straddle" earnings-toprice ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing the
stock price into the sum of the two most recent
quarters' actual earnings and the next two quarters'
forecasted earnings.
However, in the revised
assessment, the Division agreed to use a forecasted
earnings-to-price ratio.
Under this approach, the
earnings are the next four quarters' forecasted earnings.
The Division made this change because forecasted
earnings present a better view of comparable
companies' normalized earnings.
**3 Following the corrections to the income and
stock and debt indicators, the Division reconciled all of
the indicators' results to a single estimate based upon
its opinion of the relative applicability, accuracy, and
probity of each indicator.
The Division was also
guided by the Commission's decision in the 1989 case.
In that case, the Commission adopted a reconciliation
scheme whereby 80% weight was given to the income
indicator, 20% was given to the stock and debt
indicator, and no weight was given to the cost
indicator. In the settlement appraisal, these weights
were used again. (FN5)
After reconciling the indicators into a single value
estimate, the Division's appraisal for the total railroad
value changed from $6.2 billion to $5.28 billion. A
factor to apportion the value of the Utah portion of
Union Pacific's railroad systems was applied, resulting
in a $257,136,000 appraisal of market value. An
equalization ratio of 85.06% was then applied. The
product of this calculation fixed the railroad's taxable
value in Utah at $218,719,882, a 27.4% reduction
from the $301,320,000 original appraisal. In August
1993, Union Pacific and the Division stipulated to the
Commission that this revised assessment represented
the value of Union Pacific's railroad property within
Utah for ad valorem tax purposes.
On September 16, 1993, the Commission entered an
order directing the counties affected by the stipulated
assessment to show cause why the Commission should
not accept it as the value of Union Pacific's railroad
properties in Utah for property tax purposes.
On
October 15, 1993, the Counties sought to raise the
Commission's estimation of the railroad properties'
value by filing numerous objections to the revised
assessment's methodology.
On June 2, 1994, the Counties' objections were
presented at a hearing before the Commission through
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the testimony of Eckhardt Prawitt, the Counties'
appraisal expert. Most of the Counties' objections
concerned the Division and Union Pacific's application
of the income and stock and debt indicators of value.
The Counties argued that the general use of average
annual stock prices and bond yields under both
indicators yielded an estimate of value as of July 1,
1989, rather than as of the statutory lien date, January
1,1990.
The Counties further argued that the settlement
appraisal's adoption of forecasted earnings and average
annual stock prices to develop a capitalization rate
under the income indicator resulted in error.
The
Counties contended that the adoption of forecasted
earnings caused a mismatch between the earnings and
the price in the earnings-to-price ratios. Mr. Prawitt
testified that using average annual stock prices, the
revised assessment valued comparable companies'
stock prices as of July 1, 1989. However, using
forecasted earnings, the expert continued, the
comparable companies' earnings were the earnings for
either the last two quarters of 1989 and the first two of
1990 or the four quarters of 1990, depending on the
date of the appraisal.
Either way, Mr. Prawitt
concluded, the result is a mismatch between the prices
and the earnings in the earnings-to-price ratio used to
calculate a capitalization rate.
According to the
Counties, the better practice is to use the comparable
companies' actual earnings and stock prices of the final
two quarters in 1989.
**4
Finally, the Counties contended that the
settlement appraisal's use of forecasted earnings to
develop a capitalization rate conflicted with the
capitalization of Union Pacific's historical earnings.
According to Mr. Prawitt, the comparable companies'
earnings used in the earnings-to-price ratio should
match the earnings discounted by the developed
capitalization rate. For example, Mr. Prawitt testified,
an acceptable appraisal would capitalize Union
Pacific's year-end earnings, calculated as Union
Pacific's 1989 income, by a capitalization rate derived
from the comparable companies' year-end earnings in
the earnings-to-price ratio. In contrast, Mr. Prawitt
protested, the revised assessment capitalized historical
earnings, calculated as Union Pacific's average income
from 1985 through 1989, at a rate derived from
forecasted earnings in the earnings-to-price ratio. (FN6
)
In response, the Division's appraisal expert, D. Brent
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Eyre, assistant director of the Division, argued that the
Counties' objections were unfounded He testified that
the general use of average annual stock prices rather
than year-end stock prices was consistent with proper
appraisal methodology. According to Mr. Eyre, use of
such prices is "well within the confines of what is
considered one of the appropriate judgments to make in
the appraisal field."
Mr. Eyre also argued that in alleging that the revised
settlement contained a mismatch within its
capitalization rate, the Counties improperly
characterized the use of average annual stock prices.
Mr. Eyre testified as follows: The average annual
approach to pricing stock does not value stock as of
July 1 of the previous year. Rather, the aim of the
average annual pricing approach is to reliably estimate
the future value of the comparable companies' stock.
Thus, the use of average annual stock prices did not
conflict with the use of an earnings-toprice ratio
calculated with forecasted earnings because the stock
prices chosen were estimates of future stock prices.
Mr. Eyre offered a similar rebuttal to the Counties'
final objection to the revised appraisal's application of
the income indicator.
He testified as follows:
Contrary to the Counties' contention, there was no
mismatch between the development of the
capitalization rate and Union Pacific's income stream.
Rather, the Counties improperly characterized the way
in which the revised assessment calculated Union
Pacific's income.
The use of five-year averaged
income does not produce historical income; instead it
produces an estimate of Union Pacific's future income.
Like the use of average annual stock prices, use of fiveyear averaged income is justified as a way to estimate
future income on the basis of an erratic earnings
history. Put differently, to determine Union Pacific's
future income, the Division had to consider past
income that increased and decreased from year to year.
To obtain an accurate estimate, the average of the
income over the prior years was used. Thus, Mr. Eyre
concluded, the use of averaged prior earnings did not
conflict with the use of a capitalization rate derived
from forecasted earnings because the averaged income
was also an estimate of future income.
**5
Following the hearing, the Commission
requested supplemental information including the
methodological basis for the original assessment, the
underlying methodological basis for any changes to the
original assessment, and a discussion of whether the
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original assessment and any subsequent adjustments
thereto were appropriate representations of fair market
value. The Division responded with the affidavit of
Mr. Eyre. Mr. Eyre concluded that the methodologies
adopted by the Division in the settlement were
accepted methods for estimating fair market value for
property tax purposes. Moreover, Mr. Eyre stated,
many of the adjustments made by the Division were
accepted by the Commission for the same taxpayer for
the immediately preceding tax year and the Division
knew of no change of circumstances concerning Union
Pacific's railroad operations between the 1989 and the
1990 tax years that would require significant changes
in the appraisal methodologies and their applications.
"Given that the Commission determined the taxpayer's
1989 fair market value, there is no reason to believe
that the consistent application of the same methodology
to this taxpayer in 1990 would not arrive at a value
consistent with a reasonable estimate of fair market
value."
Unlike the Division, the Counties and Union Pacific
responded to the Commission's request for information
with briefs.
In the Counties' brief, in addition to
reiterating their objections to the revised assessment's
appraisal methods, the Counties argued that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider the
settlement assessment.
The Counties claimed that
under section 59-2-1007(3) of the Utah Code, the
Commission had to render a written decision resolving
Union Pacific's appeal by October 1, 1990. Because
the Commission had not resolved Union Pacific's
appeal by that time, the Counties concluded, the
Commission lacked jurisdiction to approve the revised
assessment and should reinstate the original
assessment
On December 12, 1994, the Commission,
acknowledging jurisdiction over the matter, issued an
order accepting the Division's valuation methodologies
and adopting the revised assessment of Union Pacific's
railroad properties in Utah. The Counties petitioned
for review.
The Counties argue that (1) by delaying a ruling
approving or disapproving the revised assessment
beyond the statutory deadline, October 1, 1990, the
Commission lost jurisdiction over Union Pacific's
appeal; and (2) the Commission's approval of the
revised settlement is inconsistent with both generally
accepted appraisal theory and the Commission's
statutory guidelines.
The Commission and Union
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Pacific respond that (1) the statutory deadline is
directory only, and the Commission's failure to meet
the deadline does not result in its loss of jurisdiction
over Union Pacific's appeal; and (2) the Commission's
approval of the revised assessment was based on
factual findings supported by substantial evidence and,
therefore, the approval should be upheld
H. ANALYSIS
**6 The first issue is whether the Commission lost
its jurisdiction over Union Pacific's appeal by failing to
issue a written decision by an October 1 statutory
deadline set forth in section 59-2-1007(3) of the Utah
Code. The standard of review for this issue is
governed by section 59-1-610 of the Utah Code. That
section provides, "When reviewing formal adjudicative
proceedings commenced before the commission, the ...
Supreme Court shall ... grant the commission no
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before
the appellate court."
Utah Code Ann. §
59-l-610(l)(b).
The proceeding from which the
Counties appeal was a formal adjudicative proceeding.
See Utah Admin.
Code R861-1A-5.
Also, the
Commission's conclusion that failure to satisfy section
59-2-1007(3)'s deadline does not divest it of
jurisdiction is a matter of statutory construction and
therefore a conclusion of law. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
And finally, section
59-2-1007 contains no explicit grant of discretion to
the Commission.
Thus, section 59-l-610(l)(b)
demands that we review the Commission's conclusion
under a correction of error standard.
Whether a statutory time frame is jurisdictional
depends on whether the statute's time designation is
"directory" or "mandatory."
A designation is
mandatory, and therefore jurisdictional, if it is " 'of the
essence of the thing to be done.' " Kennecott Copper
Corp, v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah
1978) (quoting 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction
§ 25.03 (4th ed.)). However, a designation is merely
directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is "
'given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and
prompt conduct of the business, and by the failure to
obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are
protected by the statute.'" Id (quoting 1A Sutherland,
Statutory Construction § 25.03 (4th ed.)).
The statute at issue in this case provides a means by
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which disgruntled taxpayers and counties may object to
property tax assessments made by the Commission.
Section 59-2-1007 states that dissatisfied taxpayers or
any county upon a showing of reasonable cause may,
on or before June 1, apply to the Commission for a
hearing to voice objections to the Commission's annual
assessment. (FN7) Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(1).
The statute further provides, "The commission shall set
a time for hearing the objection and render a written
decision no later than October 1." Id. § 59-2-1007(3).
In this case, although Union Pacific timely appealed the
Division's initial assessment on June 1, 1990, no
written decision was rendered by the Commission until
December 12, 1994, over thirty-eight months beyond
the October 1,1990, statutory deadline.
**7 In a case recently argued to this court involving
the Commission and all of the counties that are parties
to this appeal, we held that section 59-2-1007(3)'s
October 1 time designation was not mandatory, but
merely directory and therefore not jurisdictional:
"[S]ection 59-2-1007(3)'s time designation can only be
viewed as a guide 'given with a view merely to the
proper, orderly and prompt conduct' of the
Commission's business.
We hold that the
Commission's failure to meet the October 1 deadline
did not result in the loss of jurisdiction over [the
taxpayer's] appeal." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 289 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (April 25, 1996)
{PacifiCorp ). Because the Counties' arguments in
this case are no more persuasive than their arguments
in PacifiCorp, we apply that holding here.
The
Commission's failure to meet the October 1 deadline
did not result in a loss of jurisdiction over Union
Pacific's appeal.
The next issue is whether the Commission's approval
of the revised settlement is consistent with generally
accepted appraisal theory and the Commission's
statutory guidelines. The Counties challenge three of
the Commission's findings. The first is that the general
use of average annual stock prices, rather than year-end
stock prices, under the stock and debt and income
indicators is consistent with proper appraisal
methodology and the statutory mandate that the
Commission value property for tax purposes as of
January 1 of each year.
See Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-201(1). According to the Counties, the use of
average annual stock prices violated that mandate
because as Union Pacific's stock rose steadily in price
throughout 1989, the Commission, in effect, valued
Union Pacific's railroad operations as of July 1, 1989.
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The Counties' second challenge deals with a more
particular application of average annual stock prices.
The Counties challenge the Commission's finding
approving the development of the capitalization rate.
The employment of average annual stock prices, argues
the Counties, conflicts with the use of forecasted
earnings in the development of the capitalization rate
used to discount Union Pacific's income. The result,
the Counties maintain, was an impermissible mismatch
stemming from the use of forward-looking earnings
and backward-looking stock prices in the earnings-toprice ratio.
Finally, the Counties attack the Commission's
approval of the application of the capitalization rate to
discount the revised assessment's estimate of Union
Pacific's income. The Counties maintain that while the
revised settlement tabulated Union Pacific's income
using the average of Union Pacific's income from 1985
through 1989, it discounted that income at a
capitalization rate calculated with forecasted earnings.
The result, the Counties contend, is that a forwardlooking capitalization rate was improperly used to
discount historical earnings.
Union Pacific and the Commission respond that the
Counties' challenges amount to attacks upon the
Commission's findings of fact. Therefore, they argue,
this court, affording deference to the Commission's
fact-finding expertise, must apply "a substantial
evidence standard on review." Utah Code Ann. §
59-l-610(l)(a).
Under such a standard, we must
uphold the Commission's findings of fact if the findings
"are supported by substantial evidence based upon the
record as a whole." Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992).
Respondents further
argue that the Commission's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, namely, the testimony and
affidavit of Mr. Eyre, assistant director of the Division
and an expert in the field of appraisal.
**8 The first question is whether the challenged
findings are appropriately deemed findings of fact. In
PacifiCorp, we held that the proper application of
appraisal techniques was a question of fact:
The proper application of appraisal techniques
depends upon varying factual circumstances that defy
generalization: " '[Valuation is an art, not a science.
It is a function of judgment, not of natural law....
[F]or example—true market value for purposes of ad
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valorem taxation is always an estimate, always an
expression of judgment, always a result built on a
foundation of suppositions about knowledgeable and
willing buyers and sellers endowed with money and
desire, whose desires are said to converge in a dollar
description of the asset.'"
289 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 (quoting Utah Assoc, of
Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 819, 825 (Utah
1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Union Pac.
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 716 F.Supp. 543, 554
(D.Utah 1988))). Furthermore, in the same case, we
addressed a nearly identical challenge to the Counties'
attack on the Commission's approval of average annual
stock prices. In PacifiCorp, the Counties argued that
the Commission's acceptance of average annual stock
prices violated section 59-2-201(1) of the Utah Code,
directing the valuation of property as of January 1. We
concluded that "the Commission did not violate section
59-2-201(1) by approving the use of average annual
stock prices.
The approval is more appropriately
deemed a factual finding which will be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence." Id. We will treat
the Commission's challenged findings in this case
similarly. The challenged findings shall be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.
As challengers of the Commission's factual findings,
the Counties bear the burden of demonstrating that the
factual findings are erroneous.
To prevail, the
Counties must marshal all of the evidence supporting
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts
and in light of the conflicting evidence, thefindingsare
not supported by substantial evidence. See Zissi, 842
P.2d at 852; Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919,
922 (Utah 1988); Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah.Ct.App.1989). "
'Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Sat'l
Bankv. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,
1165 (Utah 1990).
The * first finding-approving the general use of
average annual stock prices to determine the stock and
debt indicator and the capitalization rate for the income
indicator—is supported by substantial evidence. The
expert of Union Pacific and the Division testified that
the use of average annual prices is "well within the
confines of what is considered one of the appropriate
judgments to make in the appraisal field." In addition,
Mr. Eyre pointed out, the Commission had approved
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the use of average annual stock prices in its resolution
of the 1989 case, and he saw no change in
circumstance that would warrant a departure from the
previous approach to pricing stock. Because we find
that the Commission's finding is supported by
substantial evidence provided by Mr. Eyre, we uphold
thisfindingof fact.
**9 The second challenged finding-approving the
revised assessment's development of the capitalization
rate calculated with forecasted earnings and average
annual stock prices-is also supported by substantial
evidence. In his affidavit, Mr. Eyre stated that this
method of developing a capitalization rate was an
accepted method and consistent with appraisal theory.
In response to the Counties' allegation of mismatching
in the development of the capitalization rate, Mr. Eyre
testified that the Counties mischaracterized the use of
average annual stock prices. According to Mr. Eyre,
the stock prices used were not historical stock prices
but estimates of future stock prices. Thus, Mr. Eyre
explained, the use of average annual stock prices was
wholly consistent with the use of forecasted earnings in
the development of the capitalization rate. Because
Mr. Eyre's affidavit and testimony are substantial
evidence supporting the Commission's finding of
approval, we uphold this finding.
The last challengedfinding—approvingthe use of a
capitalization rate developed with forecasted earnings
to discount Union Pacific's income derived from the
average of its past five years' earnings—is also
supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Eyre averred
that this method was considered a well-accepted
practice among appraisal experts. And by way of
reply to the Counties accusation of mismatching
stemming from the use of a forward-looking
capitalization rate to discount backward-looking
income, Mr. Eyre testified that the Counties
mischaracterized the calculation of income in a manner
similar to their mischaracterization of the use of
average annual stock prices. According to Mr. Eyre,
the five-year averaged earnings were not employed as
historical earnings but as an estimate of future
earnings. Thus, Mr. Eyre concluded, the discounting
of five-year averaged earnings was wholly consistent
with the use of a capitalization rate derived in part from
forecasted earnings. Since the Commission's finding
of approval is supported by substantial evidence, we
uphold this finding.
m. CONCLUSION
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We conclude that (1) the Commission did not lose
jurisdiction over Umon Pacific's appeal by failing to
issue a written decision by the statutory deadline, and
(2) the Commission's challenged findings are factual
findings that are supported by substantial evidence
We therefore affirm
ZIMMERMAN, C J , and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ, concur m Justice RUSSONS opinion
STEWART,
opinion

Associate

Chief

Justice,

separate

I concur with the majority opinion that the Utah State
Tax Commission did not lose jurisdiction over Umon
Pacific Railroad Company's appeal by failing to decide
that appeal with a written decision within the statutory
deadline specified m Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(3)
I agree that the "deadline" is directory only, not
mandatory
However, I do not agree that the various components
of the valuation formulae that the Commission employs
m computing a fair market value are properly
characterized as "factual findings" and that all the Court
needs to do is determine whether those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, I e , the opinion of a
Commission expert that a particular formula or a
variation of a formula is appropriate For example,
such issues as whether the Commission can properly
use future projected earnings combined with a past
annual average stock price to compute a capitalization
rate under the income indicator is simply not a factual
issue In this case, there is no issue as to the accuracy
of the empirical facts used to calculate the average
stock price or the future price/earnings ratio
The
issue the Court should decide but does not is the
propriety of capitalizing earnings by using a past
average stock price and projected future earnings to
compute a price/earnings ratio as a tool for valuing a
corporation
**10. The Counties contend that the Commission
employed a "forward looking capitalization rate [that]
was improperly used to discount historical earnings"
In my view, the Counties deserve an analysis of that
issue
Instead, the Court offers the unfounded
conclusion that this issue and several similar issues are
inherently factual and that the "findings" should be
sustained because the Commission's expert witness
testified that such an approach was appropnate
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The propriety of various valuation formulae, as raised
in this case, cannot be addressed by "findings of fact,"
as that term is ordinarily used Whether the various
valuation formulae the Commission employs m this
case are appropnate does not depend upon the
Commission's findings of empirical data relevant to the
formula employed.
Rather, the propriety of the
Commission's formulae depends upon whether they are
logical, reasonable, and produce valuations that
comport with how similar businesses are usually
valued and, most importantly, whether the methodology
meets the standards imposed by Article XIII of the
Utah Constitution.
For this Court to exercise its constitutional duty to
assure compliance with Article XHl, it must evaluate
Commission decisions to assure that they are based on
methodologies and formulae
that
effectuate
constitutional requirements
Of course this Court
should not, nor could it, engage m a de novo review of
the Commission's rulings
Market valuations are
concededly inherently judgmental and not subject to
precise measurements, but valuation methods must be
based on formulae that are reasonable, consistently
applied within an industry, and based on realistic
assumptions and conclusions
The Commission has developed significant and
substantial expertise in dealing with highly complicated
matters of valuation, which, as the majority opinion
points out, do indeed invohe matters of opinion and
judgment For that reason, it is appropnate for this
Court to defer to the Commission's expertise, as long as
the methodology rests on a reasonable and consistent
application of sound principles for determining fair
market value It is hardly appropnate, however, for
this Court to act as if the Commission's methodology is
an issue of fact whereby this Court all but abandons its
constitutional and statutory responsibilities of judicial
review by treating that which is not a factual inquiry as
if it were
FN1 A second alteration to the stock and debt
indicator dealt with the method of allocating Umon
Pacific's stock to its railroad operations
The
Division and Umon Pacific agreed to rely solely on an
allocation approach appro\ed m the Commission's
resolution of the 1989 case and revised the
assessment accordingly
The result was an
approximate $390 million reduction in the stock and
debt indicator
FN2 " 'Yield capitalization is a method used to convert
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future benefits into present value by discounting each
future benefit at an appropriate yield rate or by
developing an overall rate that explicidy reflects the
investment's income pattern, value change, and yield
rate.'M Utah Assoc, of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895
P.2d 819, 821 a 3 (Utah 1995) (quoting American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of
Real Estate 420 (10th ed.1992)).
FN3. An example of the direct capitalization concept is
set forth in Beaver County v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 289 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 21 a 2 (April
25,1996).
FN4. A second change also led to an increase in the
capitalization rate.
This change dealt with the
selection of comparable companies whose earnings
and stock prices would be used to calculate an
earnings-to-price ratio.
The Division and Union
Pacific agreed to select the same railroad companies
approved by the Commission in the 1989 case.
Along with the use of average annual stock prices,
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this resulted in an increased capitalization rate which,
in turn, further decreased Union Pacific's value under
the income indicator.
FN5. This amounted to another change in methodology
from the original assessment, and although the
Division could not report with specificity how this
alteration affected the final outcome, it surmised that
it may have reduced the final value by about $50
million.
FN6. The Counties also objected to the settlement
appraisal's (1) allocation of Union Pacific's equity to
its railroad operation under the stock and debt
indicator, (2) application of the cost approach, and
(3) reconciliation of the income and stock and debt
indicators. However, the Counties do not maintain
these objections on appeal, and therefore, discussing
them further is unnecessary.
FN7. The Commission must notify the taxpayer of its
assessment by May 1 of each year. Utah Code Ann.
§59-2-201(1), (4).
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